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Previous research has claimed that universities can enhance the effectiveness of knowledge transfer 
activities by establishing a clear strategic goal and aligning all their activities towards that direction. To shed 
new light on this issue, in this paper we explore the determinants of universities’ strategic choices in the field 
of knowledge transfer (KT). We identify theoretically and empirically three university KT strategies: income-
generation strategy, service-to-faculty strategy, and local development strategy. We then investigate the role 
of university-level factors that determine the strategic choice of universities, particularly focussing on 
university horizontal (generalist vs. specialist) and vertical (high vs. low prestige) diversity. The empirical 
analysis relies on a unique survey of 178 university TTO managers across European universities, combined 
with additional data sources. Our results show that generalist and low prestige universities mainly pursue 
the local development strategy, while specialist and high prestige ones are more oriented towards the 
income generation strategy. These findings are highly relevant for theory and practice of KT in academic 
insitutions, given the relevance that the university third mission has for economic and societal development. 
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Universities are key agents of economic and social progress. Their current role has increasingly added 
interactions with industry, and with the society more generally, to the traditional missions of teaching and 
research (Kapetaniou and Lee, 2017). The role of universities so conceived has attracted considerable 
attention from scholars and policy-makers (Hsu et al., 2015; Trune and Goslin, 1998). Accordingly, several 
studies have focused not only on the traditional university’s goals of teaching and research but also on the 
third mission of knowledge transfer (KT). KT is a complex and rapidly evolving phenomenon based on the 
interactions of several stakeholders. Universities may address various objectives through KT activities, such 
as providing services to faculty, enhancing innovation and the practical use of research results, generating 
additional income streams, fostering local economic development, complying with national and institutional 
policies, and promoting public value (Bozeman et al., 2015). Several researchers have claimed that a 
scattered approach in serving these objectives is less effective than adopting a strategic approach by more 
clearly identifying a narrow set of institutional goals and priorities and then working to implement coherent 
actions to reach those goals (Axanova, 2008; Feldman et al., 2002; Siegel and Phan, 2005; Siegel et al., 2007).  
However, despite the general claims of the importance of university administrators’ adopting a 
strategic perspective in the field of KT, we still know very little about strategic-goal setting in this area and, 
in particular, how it should match an institution’s unique characteristics. Since universities differ along 
various dimensions, including the pool of available resources, the scale and focus of their research efforts, 
and the level of experience in technology licensing, patenting and spin-offs, it is likely that they would not 
adopt a single style for KT (NRC Report, 2010). This is confirmed by the evidence that TTOs may adopt 
different organisational structures depending on the intended goal to be pursued (Bercovitz et al. 2001; 
Huyghe et al., 2014; Markman et al. 2005). When analyzing KT processes, it is possible to identify at least four 
interconnected domains, namely (i) the decision of the strategic orientation of universities toward KT 
activities; (ii) the definition of specific goals that TTOs intends to pursue to serve the university strategy; (iii) 
the identification of the TTOs’ optimal structure to manage such goals; and (iv) the performance assessment 
of TTO operations. Surprisingly, researchers have mainly considered the last three domains, disregarding the 
role of the university in orchestrating the entire process. Yet, it is well accepted that the commercialization 
of the knowledge created within universities represents “a conscious and strategic effort” (Brescia et al., 
2016: 133). This will be the focus of our work. 
Starting with these premises, in this paper, we are interested in addressing the following research 
questions: What are the main orientations that universities strategically adopt in performing their KT 
activities? How are university characteristics associated with the choice of one strategic model with respect 
to another? Building on the literature on technology transfer (Axanova, 2012; Bozeman et al., 2015; Feldman 
et al., 2002; Siegel et al., 2007; Sharer and Faley, 2008), we first identify three strategic configurations for 
3 
 
universities in the field of KT, which depend on the major emphasis that they devote to a specific set of 
priorities: Income-generation strategy; Service-to-faculty strategy; Local Development strategy. We then 
discuss and empirically identify the underlying factors that should drive the KT strategic choices of 
universities, focusing on two dimensions: university horizontal diversity (i.e., generalist versus specialist 
universities) and university vertical diversity (i.e., university institutional prestige). Our empirical analysis 
relies on a unique survey of 178 university Technology Transfer Office (TTO) managers across European 
universities, undertaken in the course of the Horizon 2020 project Progress TT1, combined with additional 
data sources.  
This paper intends to extend the literature in two main directions. Firstly, we contribute to the 
literature on higher education institutions that has developed the notion of university strategy (see e.g. 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007; Daraio et al., 2011; Deiaco et al., 2012; Warning, 2004; Whitley, 2008). In 
particular, we aim at conceptualizing different configurations of KT strategies pursued by universities in the 
European context. Secondly, we investigate the factors that influence the relevance and choice of a given KT 
strategy. Specifically, with the aim to fill the gap in the literature on KT strategies, strongly focused on TTOs, 
we focus on university characteristics: we investigate whether and to what extent horizontal and vertical 
differentiation matter in the strategy pursued for KT activities. Horizontal diversity refers to the disciplinary 
subject mix in education and the scope of research activity, while vertical diversity refers to the position of 
the university in a hierarchy of prestige.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature related to 
university strategies in the field of KT. Section 3 discusses the effect of university-level factors on the choice 
of a given KT strategy and presents the empirical hypotheses. Section 4 illustrates the construction of the 
dataset and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 5 describes the methodology employed in the 
empirical analysis and shows the results, including a set of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes by 
summing up and discussing the contribution of this work and its implications. 
  
                                                            
1 Progress TT (“University Growing Europe Through best practice SolutionS for Technology Transfer”) is a European 
Union H2020 funded project. The overall goal of the project is to contribute to Europe’s economic growth by ensuring 
that Public Research Organisations (PROs) are better equipped to transfer valuable knowledge to industry, which leads 
to increased innovation and, in turn, economic growth. To this end, best practices in TT have been gathered and 
formulated into TT tools, methods and training materials that, together with coaching and mentoring programs, will 
support European Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) in improving their performance and access to finance. For more 




2. Literature review 
2.1  The strategic diversity of higher education institutions 
The literature on higher education institutions has increasingly discussed the notion of university strategy, 
starting with the seminal contribution by Keller (1983). The idea of strategy in universities emerged in the 
United States in the late 1970s and 1980s. It then spread rapidly in other contexts, such as Continental 
Europe, often as a response to external pressures, such as institutional reforms of higher education systems, 
cuts in public funding, increasing diffusion and interest in international university league tables or rankings 
(Harvey, 2008; Kogan, 1997; Whitley, 2008). In this context, developing clear strategic thinking has thus 
become increasingly important for universities to facilitate the attraction of human talent and financial 
resources and reaffirm their centrality in the economic and social system.  
As a response to the increasing relevance of the concept, several attempts to apply the notion of 
strategy to universities have emerged in the literature (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007; Daraio et al., 2011; 
Deiaco et al., 2012; Warning, 2004). A fundamental condition for the implementation of strategic behavior is 
an internal decision-making process that is empowered by some level of autonomy and discretionary power 
in collecting the resources to be allocated to strategic objectives (Whitley, 2008). Under this logic, Bonaccorsi 
and Daraio (2007: 11) define university strategy as “an emergent pattern of configuration of university 
outputs that depend on (relatively) autonomous decision making by universities, supported by appropriate 
combinations of resources (inputs).” However, the previous literature has emphasized the risks of 
simplistically extending the concepts and terms that are related to strategic decision-making from the realm 
of business to the higher-education system, due to conceptual and methodological limitations (Gumport, 
2001; Amaral et al, 2002; Whitley, 2008). First, because of their historical origins, most universities carry the 
“weight of tradition” and “follow largely institutionalized and general rules that limit the scope for 
discretionary behavior” (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007: 9). Second, as most universities are public institutions, 
they largely depend on public money (allocated outside of the reach of their power) thus limiting their 
strategic actorhood. Third, universities often act as “loosely coupled systems,” where subunits (e.g., schools, 
departments) are relatively autonomous and independent from one another, and resources are distributed 
according to predefined rules (Cohen et al., 1972; Cohen and March, 1974).  
On the one hand, there are reasonable conceptual objections to a simplistic application of the notion 
of strategy to higher education institutions. On the other hand, an ad-hoc and more narrowly defined notion 
of strategy would allow the explanation of major differences in the approaches followed by higher education 
institutions as far as the authority exercised over resource acquisition, use and disposal is concerned (Deiaco 
et al., 2013; Whitley, 2008). For instance, several studies have recently characterized the differentiation 
patterns of universities in a wide variety of countries (Daraio et al., 2011; Kempkes and Pohl, 2010; Warning, 
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2004). Daraio et al. (2011) classify the position and evolution of specific universities in the European higher-
education landscape with respect to several structural elements, such as research orientation, research 
intensity, degree of autonomy, horizontal diversity (i.e., mix of subjects taught), and vertical diversity (i.e., 
position of a university in a hierarchy of prestige). With the aim of understanding the differences among 
German universities with regard to their levels of efficiency, Kempkes and Pohl (2010) find that faculty 
composition and structure are highly relevant in explaining efficiency results. In the same context, Warning 
(2004) asserts that “initial investments and different strategic actions of universities lead to their different 
positions in the higher education sector. Pursuing similar strategies leads to similar positions that influence 
structure and performance within the system” (Kempkes and Pohl, 2010: 393). From this research, the 
importance of applying a strategic lens to universities is clear as they may pursue different missions and, 
therefore, be focused in different ways.  
However, existing studies mainly focus on the characterization of universities along the two 
traditional missions of education and research, whereas less attention has been devoted to the identification 
and analysis of universities’ strategies in the so-called “Third Mission” area, which is centered on research 
valorization and KT. This is surprising for two main reasons. Firstly, a large and growing literature has 
documented various forms of involvement of universities in KT activities. Secondly, universities are 
addressing the growing need to develop tighter linkages between science, technology and innovation and 
contribute to local economic and societal development (Etzkowitz, 2002; O’Shea et al., 2005). Thus, in line 
with the idea that “entrepreneurial universities” have the ability to develop a focused strategic orientation - 
not only in terms of academic goals but also in translating the knowledge produced into economic and social 
value (Clark 1998) - we propose a theoretical and empirical assessment of universities’ strategic choices in 
the KT area and their characterization in distinct configurations, which is largely missing in the literature, as 
we discuss in the following section. 
2.2 The strategic orientation of universities in knowledge transfer   
Knowledge transfer (KT) refers to the multiple ways in which knowledge from universities and public research 
institutions can be exploited by firms and other organizations to generate economic and social value and 
industry development (OECD, 2013). It encompasses a broad range of activities to support the collaborations 
between universities, industry and the public sector, and it involves a variety of goals, modes and channels. 
While early research has mainly focused on the objectives related to the commercialization of intellectual 
property rights generated from universities (with a major emphasis on patents and licensing activity), 
subsequent studies have emphasized additional missions, such as providing service to faculty, enhancing 
innovation and the practical use of research results, fostering local economic development, complying with 
national and institutional policies, and promoting public value (Bozeman et al., 2015). This orientation is in 
line with the definition of KT activities, which, by their nature, address multiple stakeholders with multiple 
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goals and expectations (scientists, TTO managers, PRO administrators, industry, investors, and policy-makers 
at the regional, national and international levels). 
Universities have a pivotal role as independent knowledge institutions. Their overarching aims are to 
ensure that their graduates develop the skills needed to successfully thrive in future job, and to open up to 
collaboration with external stakeholders when it comes to KT (Meissner and Shmatko, 2017). Therefore, it is 
reasonable for universities to refine and adjust their managerial models to the changing landscape of the job 
market and of the knowledge generation and diffusion processes. This is particularly true with respect to KT 
activities. In fact, although universities typically serve all KT missions, management practices should be 
carefully considered because they seem to serve different purposes (Benassi et al, 2017). In particular, several 
researchers and practitioners have highlighted that universities should adopt a specific strategic approach to 
more clearly identify a set of institutional goals and priorities and then try to implement coherent actions to 
reach such goals (Feldman et al., 2002; Sharer and Faley, 2008; Siegel et al., 2007). Siegel et al. (2007) argue 
that universities should make strategic choices regarding institutional goals and priorities in KT to drive 
resource allocation decisions and choices regarding the mode of commercialization that they wish to 
emphasize. Bozeman et al. (2015), while reviewing the literature on KT effectiveness, suggest that studies of 
KT programs should adapt and customize their assessment to reflect the differences in the strategic 
orientation of the involved organizations. Similarly, moving from the perspective of TTO practitioners, 
Axanova (2012) and Sharer and Faley (2008), claim that for a university TTO, as for any organization, having 
unfocused goals can lead to conflicting operational objectives and ultimately to ineffectiveness.  
However, despite the general claim of the importance of university KT strategic orientation, only 
limited attempts have been made to conceptualize a taxonomy of KT strategies and to operationalize it. 
Moreover, a thorough analysis of the underlying factors that should drive the KT strategic choices of 
universities is still missing in the literature.2  
2.3  A classification of universities’ knowledge transfer strategies  
Recent studies in the field of KT underline that universities are characterized by various strategic 
configurations in KT activities (e.g. Axanova, 2012; Batalia, 2006; Brescia et al., 2016; Feldman et al., 2002; 
Sharer and Faley, 2008). For instance, Axanova (2012) reviews US technology transfer models, identifying 
traditional, experimental and hypothetical models. While experimental and hypothetical models are broader 
approaches that have been proposed at hypothetical level and are now being tried or are yet to be tried, 
traditional models have been used for several decades. In particular, traditional models are oriented towards 
                                                            
2 Differently from the case of universities, various studies investigate the strategic organization of TTOs for KT 
activities. For instance, a recent study by Battaglia et al (2017) analyse how TTOs organize themselves to achieve 
external growth. They show that TTOs choose to configure the relationship with other TTOs in three different 
organizational structures, illustrating the characteristics of these, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. 
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the core missions of universities, thus including services provision, revenue generation and support to 
economic development. Experimental and hypothetical approaches include KT models that stress the 
inventor’s and researcher’s research interests, the importance of developing alliances with large research 
oriented companies (e.g. pharmaceutical), the possibility to develop KT collaborations among universities, 
and the radical proposal to let researchers protect their inventions through independent agents so to 
increase competition (Axanova, 2012). 
In a similar vein, Brescia et al. (2016) analyse the organizational structures of TTOs of the world top 200 
ranked universities by specifically considering how universities organize their KT activities. From their study, 
it emerges that universities may adopt three models: “Internal”, “External” and “Mix”, depending on the 
organizational positioning of the TTO with respect to the university. The “Internal” model, where all TTO 
activities are managed by a dedicated office internal to the university, is the prevalent one in their sample. 
Feldman et al. (2002) focus on revenue strategies pursued by US universities: they investigate universities’ 
use of equity for KT activities as a function of various factors, including the organization of the TTO. With 
respect to the latter, they show that when TTOs are expected to be financially self-supported, the propensity 
to adopt equity-based mechanisms is lower, because of higher risks associated with such strategy. Sharer 
and Faley (2008) investigate four KT organizational goals of TTOs in the attempt to show that the choice of a 
primary KT goal should impact strategy and align with operations and policy, so to generate an effective 
organization of KT activities. Specifically, the authors compare the following goals: “providing a service for 
researchers”, “maximizing the societal benefit of new technologies”, “acting as an engine for local economic 
development” and “acting as a revenue generator for the institution”. 
Building on the insights of this stream of literature, we identify three strategic configurations of universities 
in the area of KT, depending on the emphasis that they devote to a specific set of KT priorities:  
− Income-generation strategy 
− Service-to-faculty strategy 
− Local development strategy3  
In the case of the “Income-generation Strategy,” the major emphasis of the university and its TTO is 
on maximizing the stream of revenues that can be generated from the commercialization of ideas and 
inventions that are disclosed from research to industry (Axanova, 2012; Sharer and Faley, 2008). This model 
is based on a profit-driven logic, according to which universities’ KT experts work with the faculty to generate 
                                                            
3 Conceptually, we do not claim that KT strategies are mutually exclusive, because the underlying missions at their basis 
tend to be jointly shared by all universities (and related TTOs). We rather intend that each university (and its related 
TTO) may place relatively more emphasis, attention and resources on the achievement of a specific set of priorities, 




revenues that come from research, particularly from licensing agreements and industry-sponsored research 
contracts. For instance, licensing agreements involve selling to companies the rights to use university’s 
inventions in return for revenue in the form of upfront fees or royalty payments. The distribution of licensing 
revenues from universities is typically highly skewed, with many inventions that do not generate sizeable net 
returns, but with a few big commercial successes that generate large returns (Barjak et al., 2014; Feldman et 
al., 2002). Pursuing this strategy thus shows a strong orientation towards the generation of university-owned 
patented inventions and their commercial exploitation to reap financial rewards. The success measures of 
this model are primarily centered on income streams from royalty agreements or patent sales, as well as 
income that is derived from industry-sponsored research contracts. 
The “Service-to-Faculty Strategy” emphasizes the diffusion and practical application of knowledge 
outside of academia through dedicated support to faculty as a primary mission of KT activities (Sharer and 
Faley, 2008). This model focuses on developing long-term capacity building at different levels, from the 
individual scientist to organizational actors. The capacity to create and apply new knowledge and technology 
depends not only on the maturation among faculty of the skills and know-how that are related to research 
valorization but also on the creation of social and professional networks or technological communities 
(Bozeman et al., 2015). These networks generate opportunities for research collaboration and job mobility 
and reveal possible applications for scientific and technical results that stem from academic laboratories. A 
TTO that focuses on helping researchers to valorize their discoveries should therefore engage in scouting 
activities to attract top scientists with commercially focused research projects, respond quickly to faculty 
inquiries, offer business development assistance to research, and emphasize quick and efficient deal-making 
in collaboration with industry (Sharer and Faley, 2008). In this model, more emphasis is placed on the number 
of invention disclosures, the number of inventions that are patented, exposure to research funding, 
collaboration and network activity, and faculty recruitment and retention, rather than licensing revenue or 
start-up formation (Axanova, 2012; Batalia, 2006; Rasor and Heller, 2006) 
Finally, the “Local Development Strategy” emphasizes the attempt to contribute to the growth of the 
local economic systems where universities are embedded, by generating opportunities for knowledge 
exchange and new ventures creation (Axanova, 2012; Sharer and Faley, 2008). The role of universities that 
pursue this model is to facilitate the development of technologies that form the basis for new ventures that 
are founded by researchers and/or students, and the development of technologies that match the interests 
and skills of local firms. Because creating new companies is the most immediate way to generate new jobs, 
university spin-offs and start-up formation is a central component of the strategy that is oriented towards 
local and regional economic development (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Sharer and Faley, 2008). For these 
reasons, under this model universities and TTOs tend to work closely to generate partnerships with local 
public and private actors, for instance by establishing local incubators, proof-of-concept programs, 
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accelerator programs, seed funds or industry-sponsored research labs (Munari et al., 2016 and 2018). 
Measures of the success of this model include start-up formation by university faculty or students (and 
related turnover or employment growth), the creation of local jobs and the retention of graduate students 
in those jobs. 
 
3. The antecedents of universities’ KT strategies: hypotheses 
Previous studies suggest that universities’ strategic choices in KT should be aligned with the more general 
goals and missions of an academic institution and they should reflect its distinctive characteristics (Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Feldman et al., 2002; Siegel et al., 2007; Sharer and Faley, 2008). Universities have 
different positions in the higher education sector, hence resulting in a variety of university potential 
categories. Such variety is particularly relevant for understanding how university-specific characteristics 
explain the prevalence of a given KT strategic orientation with respect to another. To explore the set of 
drivers of universities’ strategic orientations towards KT activities that we have identified, we exploit  two 
dimensions that emerged as particularly relevant in the literature on higher education institutions (Brescia 
et al., 2016; Daraio et al., 2011; Teichler, 2005): the degree of specialization of the university (“horizontal 
diversity”) and the prestige and research quality of the institution (“vertical diversity”). Figure 1 shows a 
diagram of the conceptual model and hypothesized relationships that we are going to present in the next 
sub-section. 
-- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
3.1 University horizontal diversity 
“Horizontal diversity” (Daraio et al, 2011; Teichler, 1988, 2002) refers to the disciplinary subject mix in 
education and the scope of research activity. In terms of education, a university may decide to offer a broad 
range of courses to differentiate student audiences or to adopt different teaching methodologies. Bonaccorsi 
and Daraio (2007) suggest that universities may specialize in large-scale undergraduate education or Masters 
or PhD education. As far as the research mission is concerned, universities may decide to be a leader in basic 
research, an innovative and industry-orientated university in applied fields, or a provider of proximity 
research in local development. In this paper, we refer to the horizontal distinction between specialist and 
generalist universities in terms of disciplinary subject mix in education and research. In particular, we identify 
specialist universities as those that are focused on applied sciences, thus offering a narrow subject mix (such 
as polytechnic schools or medical schools), whereas generalist universities provide a wide range of courses 
that span several macro-subjects and disciplines (humanities, social sciences, science, technology, and 
medical). Therefore, specialized universities show lower levels of horizontal diversity as compared to 
generalist universities.  
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With respect to the KT scientific orientation, universities that specialize in applied sciences generally 
display higher availability of qualified researchers in specific scientific domains, hence presenting a critical 
mass that is useful to substantially advance a given technological field. In addition, these universities tend to 
focus more closely on the needs of industry than do other universities, thus being prone to achieving research 
outputs that are more likely to be commercialized in the market and generate significant streams of revenue. 
Additionally, moved by a deep understanding of the market needs to which their technological products 
refer, specialist universities tend to devote higher efforts than generalist universities in the creation of 
collaborations with industry to increase the chances of reaching the market with their research outputs. 
These are the pre-conditions for pursuing an income-oriented KT strategy. Therefore, we formulate our first 
hypothesis, as follows: 
• Hp 1.a Specialist universities are more oriented towards income generation 
objectives in their KT activities 
Research activities inside generalist universities are not typically limited to technological and 
scientific domains, since they also include the humanities and social sciences domains (Battaglia et al., 2017). 
For this reason, the support provided by KT staff to faculty is wider and at the same time, more general than 
the support provided inside specialist universities. KT staff within such universities tend to be less involved 
in scouting activities to attract top scientists with commercially focused research projects, and devote 
relatively less attention to supporting faculty in the patenting and commercialisation process.  In addition, 
generalist universities have lower incentives to activate internal support structures and financial programs 
to foster the commercial exploitation of their discoveries (Munari et al., 2016). For these reasons, generalist 
universities are likely to be less prone to pursue a KT strategy primarily oriented at providing services to 
faculty. Moreover, TTOs that are not specialized in a given field often lack a highly developed network of 
relationship within the scientific community and with the industry base. This causes lower visibility and lower 
exposure to research collaboration and funding opportunities. From these considerations, we argue that: 
• Hp 1.b Generalist universities are less oriented towards service-to-faculty 
objectives in their KT activities 
Universities that offer a broad range of courses in several fields tend to be characterized by wide-
reaching goals such as generating opportunities for students and, more generally, contributing to the 
economic development of local areas (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007). Within generalist universities, 
knowledge transfer activities from humanities and social sciences domains tend to present distinctive 
characteristics, being centered on public engagement, consulting and research collaboration activities, rather 
than patenting and licensing (Olmos-Peñuela et al., 2014). Therefore, they tend to rely more on personal and 
direct interactions and they tend to be more strictly rooted in the local or regional context. Furthermore, 
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given the wider spectrum of fields that generalist universities cover, they can develop a heterogeneous set 
of competencies among faculty and students, which span from technical excellence to business, artistic and 
cultural expertise. Additionally, they manage to develop contacts outside of academia in all of these areas, 
thereby increasing the probability of success of new ventures, which require a heterogeneous background 
within the entrepreneurial team (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Kochenkova et al., 2016; Lockett and Wright, 
2005; Vanaelst et al., 2006). These arguments lead us to our third hypothesis: 
• Hp 1.c Generalist universities are more oriented towards local development 
objectives in their KT activities 
 
3.2 University vertical diversity  
The second argument for cross-university variation in KT strategic orientation is based on university prestige. 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2007) label this dimension “vertical diversity” in order to identify the position of the 
university in a hierarchy of prestige. As in the case of horizontal diversity, this notion relies on various metrics 
that depend on the specific dimension of the analysis (e.g. teaching, academic research, KT activities). To 
capture European university vertical diversity, we consider the prestige of research measured by 
international university rankings, following previous practice in extant research (Bonaccorsi et al., 2015; 
Brescia et al., 2016; Sine et al., 2003). 
High performing organizations exploit their credibility by sending signals of quality to external 
parties, thus attracting their attention. This may have various effects, including (i) increasing the probability 
of financial endorsements by potential investors (Munari et al, 2015), (ii) facilitating access to people with 
expert knowledge and talent (O’Shea et al., 2005), and (iii) supporting intensive interactions and 
opportunities for collaboration with industrial partners (D’Este and Patel, 2007). In other words, high-prestige 
universities are better positioned to establish networking activities and accomplish commercialisation 
agreements. Accordingly, several studies have postulated a positive relationship between the quality of 
university research and the likelihood of interaction with industry to create social and professional networks, 
hence favoring the exploitation of research results (Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Tornquist and Kallsen, 1994). 
Furthermore, prestigious research tend to facilitate the creation of a wide and robust pool of technologies 
available for commercialization, increasing the propensity of researchers to exploit their inventions and 
capturing the income flows generated through their intellectual capital (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; O’Shea 
et al., 2005; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001).  Following these arguments, we formulate the hypothesis below: 
• Hp 2.a High-prestige universities are more oriented towards income-generation 
objectives in their KT activities 
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On the other hand, low-prestige universities are not able to reach a critical mass of human capital 
endowed with strong scientific and technical expertise, which is the main requisite for the development of 
cutting-edge technologies. Relatedly, formula-based funding allocation, implying the allocation of a part of 
the public research funding on the basis of competitive performance, results in less funds assigned to low 
tier universities (Daraio et al., 2011). As a consequence, TTOs of low-prestige institutions are likely to be 
endowed with less resources than top institutions (Rasor and Heller, 2006).4 Regardless of the budget of the 
office and the quality of the support staff, without great research TTOs will have not much to protect, market, 
and license (Rasor and Heller, 2006). Therefore, the support offered to faculty for the realization of KT 
activities is likely to be weak. In other words, low-quality universities fail to support the faculty and staff so 
to counterbalance the lack of non-technical experience and of resources. Indeed, the lower visibility and 
reputation of non-top universities may hamper the achievement of the complementary human and financial 
resources that are necessary to diffuse their knowledge outputs. Thus, we postulate that: 
• Hp 2.b Low-prestige universities are less oriented towards service-to-faculty 
objectives in their KT activities 
Universities are increasingly called to adopt a strategic orientation to meet a pool of goals related 
not only to the scientific field but also to the more general economic development (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). 
Such strategic orientation is expected to be different, depending on the layer in which universities are 
positioned in the hierarchy of quality. On the one hand, top universities, characterized by high levels of 
prestige, funding and professionalized TTOs, are in the position to undertake research commercialisation 
activities at the global level. Accordingly, external stakeholders (including governments and public opinion) 
may expect top universities to meet a profile of what a prestigious university looks like (Gioia and Thomas, 
1996). More concretely, they should be able to extract a substantial value from their research and KT 
activities and, therefore, provide a strong contribution in terms economic development at the international 
level. On the other hand, the limited resources and visibility characterizing low-prestige universities force 
them to pursue narrower and more local orientations, by implementing patterns of actions mainly directed 
at the economic development of the local context they are embedded in. In this case, an increased sensitivity 
to the external environment and a tight fit with the local environmental needs are the main priorities for 
these universities. Accordingly, we suggest that: 
• Hp 2.c Low prestige universities are more oriented towards local development 
objectives in their KT activities 
                                                            
4 The way TTOs are funded and budgeted should be firmly founded on the mission and overall objective of the 
university. However, the size of the budget of TTOs generally correlates with the research base or overall faculty size 
of a university. In other words “The more you have to work with, the larger your office is going to be” (Rasor and 




4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample selection and data sources  
The dataset that we use to test empirically our hypotheses is made up of information collected from various 
sources of data. The primary data source is an original survey of university TTO managers that we carried out 
in the course of the H2020 Progress-TT project, in collaboration with the other project partners.5 In order to 
construct the sample to investigate our research questions, we conducted a survey addressed at university 
TTO managers from 27 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) 
plus Turkey. The survey aimed at collecting first-hand information on several dimensions of KT activities 
inside universities, including demographic information of universities and TTOs and TTOs’ structure and 
operations. A sample of 521 TTOs has been contacted between spring and summer 2015. The sample has 
been extracted from the list of TTOs that are associated with ASTP-Proton, which is a pan-European 
association for professionals who are involved in knowledge transfer between universities and industry, and 
complemented with TTOs belonging to other national TTO associations. The survey was administered in two 
phases: firstly, paper copies of the survey were distributed at the ASTP-Proton 2015 Annual Conference that 
was held in May; secondly, the remaining TTOs were contacted by email and/or by phone, asking TTO 
managers to fill out the survey that was sent electronically through the Survey Monkey platform. Three email 
and/or phone recalls were conducted over the following three months. We obtained 225 completed 
questionnaires out of the 521 TTOs contacted, which corresponds to a 43% response rate. After excluding 
observations with missing data on the variables that are used in our empirical analysis, we retained a final 
sample of 178 questionnaires across 26 countries (response rate of 34.16%).6  
In addition to the survey data, we used the European Tertiary Education Register (ETER) dataset and the 
Times Higher Education (THE) Ranking (both available online) to collect data on other university-level 
characteristics as of 2014. ETER is a database of higher education institutions in Europe (HEIs), currently 
                                                            
5 The survey of TTO professionals was part of the H2020 funded project PROGRESS-TT. It was designed and implemented 
by the following partnering organizations: the Department of Management of the University of Bologna, ASTP-PROTON, 
Fraunhofer MOEZ, Mito Technology and Pera Consulting.  
6 Table 9 in Appendix A shows the detailed response rate per country. Countries are listed according to the % response 
rate: the survey obtained a 100% response rate in Turkey, France, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Estonia; the 
lowest rate was reached in Spain and Belgium (13%); there are also few countries where no responses were obtained. 
The large response rate in Turkey is due to the fact that the first batch of questionnaires was administered in paper 
copies at the ASTP-Proton 2015 Annual Conference that was held in Istanbul, where arguably almost all TTO 




including information on 2,673 HEIs from 36 countries.7 It builds on the EUropean MIcroDAta project 
(EUMIDA), a large-scale study supported by the European Commission between 2009 and 2011. The THE 
Ranking is a world university ranking that is conducted every year and provides a list of the 400 world's best 
universities, which are evaluated across research, teaching, industry funding, international outlook and 
citations.8 Finally, we collected NUTS2-level data from Eurostat regional statistics.9 Since we combine various 
data sources to construct our variables, potential problems of common method bias are largely controlled 
for (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
4.2 Variables 
In this paper, we investigate the antecedents of university KT strategies via regression analysis. In particular, 
we study the role of university horizontal and vertical differentiation. To do so, we estimate a model in which 
university KT strategies depend on the above factors, along with a complete set of control variables at the 
TTO, university and regional level. The list of our variables, their description and the data sources used for 
their operationalization are presented in Table 1.  
-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –  
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables measure the extent to which universities rely upon income-based, service-based or 
development-based KT strategies. As underlined in the literature section (see section 2.2.), KT include all 
activities through which knowledge from universities and public research institutions is exploited to generate 
economic and social value and industry development (OECD, 2013). These activities include IPRs and their 
exploitation, spin-off creation, generation of opportunities for faculty. KT strategy refers to universities’ 
strategic choices in the KT area, thus to the main activities pursued by universities in terms of knowledge 
transfer. For this reason, in order to measure them we exploit a question of the Progress-TT survey that 
specifically addresses the importance of various objectives pursued inside universities. Respondents are 
asked to indicate which of the following seven objectives best characterize (on a 1-5 Likert scale from 
unimportant to extremely important) the KT priorities of the university/TTO:  
1) revenue generation from licensing 
2) revenue generation from research 
3) facilitate practical application of research discoveries 
4) economic development through spin-off creation 
5) contribution to local and regional development 






6) provide service to faculty 
7) generate opportunities for students 
We perform explorative factor analysis (FA) with the principal component method on the seven items with 
the aim of identifying underlying driving factors that could allow to classify university KT strategic models.10 
The analysis reveals three major factors with eigenvalue above 1, explaining 62.2% of the variation in the 
original seven items. The results of the factor analysis are fully reported in Appendix B.11 The first factor drives 
items (4), (5) and (7); the second factor underpins items (1) and (2); the third factor drives the remaining 
items (3) and (6). The retained factors resemble the three KT strategies that emerged from the literature 
(Axanova, 2012; Bozeman et al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2002; Siegel et al., 2007; Sharer and Faley, 2008). 
Factor 1 is linked to economic development objectives, Factor 2 suggests income related objectives, and 
Factor 3 corresponds to services-to-research oriented objectives. The derived KT strategies along with survey 
items and their factor loadings from factor analysis are reported in Table 2.  
-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE –  
We work out three dependent variables as weighted averages of each of the seven items, where weights are 
the scoring coefficients of the factors extracted through FA. For each Factor, higher weights are associated 
to the more related items, while lower weights are associated to unrelated (or less related) items. Therefore, 
items (4), (5) and (7) have the highest weights in Factor 1, items (1) and (2) in Factor 2 and items (3) and (6) 
in Factor 3.12 In so doing we obtain three composite indicators of the importance of a given KT strategy for 
each university. Our dependent variables are called Local development strategy, Income-generation strategy 
and Service-to-faculty strategy, respectively. 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
As illustrated in the previous sections of the paper, we are interested in the role of horizontal university 
diversity (generalist versus specialist university) and vertical university diversity (university institutional 
prestige) for KT strategies pursued by universities.  
Our measure of horizontal differentiation is a dummy that is equal to 1 for generalist universities. 
The variable, called Generalist university, is created from a variable of the ETER dataset called “Institutional 
                                                            
10 We follow the guidelines provided in the OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD, 2008). 
Before carrying out FA, we implement the Kaiser-Meyker-Olkin (KMO) test to measure sample adequacy and the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity to test the hypothesis that the individual elements of the correlation matrix are 
uncorrelated. The KMO test shows that sampling adequacy is above the acceptable value of 0.6 (KMO=0.604). The 
Bartlett’s test has a p value well below <0.001 (p=0.0000), thus allowing to reject the hypothesis of uncorrelation.  
11 Table 11 in Appendix B shows the pairwise correlations among non-standardised survey items; FA is carried out on 
the standardised items and the 3 obtained factors are rotated through varimax rotation (see Tables 12 and 13); we 
then predict the scoring coefficients that indicated the weight of each item within a given factor (see Table 14). 
12 See table 14 in Appendix B. 
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Category Standardized” assuming value 1 for generalist universities, 2 for specialist universities and 0 for 
others. We recode it assigning value 1 only to universities that have been clearly identified as generalist. We 
assign 0 to all others, which are mostly specialist universities. The latter include Engineering Schools, 
Polytechnic Schools, Institutes of Technology, universities of Applied Sciences and Medical Schools. This 
variable intends to capture universities’ positioning with respect to course offerings: generalist universities 
offer a wide variety of degree courses, typically in almost all disciplines, whereas specialist universities focus 
on a given small set of disciplines, typically applied ones. This is in line with the extant evidence that shows 
that generalist universities are the predominant model in Europe (Daraio et al, 2011). 
Second, we measure university institutional prestige with a dummy that is equal to 1 if the university 
was part of the list of top schools in the world in 2014, as indicated by the THE Ranking. All of the other 
universities that did not enter the world ranking have 0 on the dummy. The variable, which is called High-
prestige university, intends to measure universities’ positioning with respect to an international world-level 
hierarchy of institution quality. We use the information that is provided by the THE Ranking because it 
provides a ranking based on various dimensions of quality (i.e. research, teaching, industry funding, 
international outlook and citations), thus providing an overall measure of quality.  
4.2.3 Control variables 
We introduce control variables at the level of the TTO, at the level of the university, and at the regional level, 
with the aim of better isolating the effect of the independent variables on university KT strategies.  
TTO level control variables 
Given that the TTO is the unit that is in charge of managing KT activities, we expect that the KT strategic 
orientation of a university is also linked to the governance arrangements of its TTO. More precisely, we 
control for the presence of incentives to TTO managers, the level of autonomy of the TTO, TTO size, TTO age 
and whether the TTO provides its services to more than one University. All of these variables are obtained 
through the Progress-TT survey.  
TTO incentives is a variable that allows us to investigate whether incentivizing directly those who are 
primarily involved in the KT process has any impact on the importance of the KT strategy that universities 
mainly pursue. This variable is a dummy equaling 1 for TTOs having incentive schemes for the staff and/or 
management of the TTO, 0 otherwise. Since TTOs manage most activities that bring revenues from 
commercialization, such as licensing agreements, the adoption of an Income-generation strategy may 
significantly depend on the effort that TT officers enact in eliciting invention disclosure, successfully 
marketing inventions and closing deals (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2007; Feldman et al., 2002). Thus, we 




We measure TTO autonomy by means of three exclusive dummies. Firstly, TTO autonomy low equals 
1 for TTOs whose strategic priorities are only set from the top management of the university. Secondly, TTO 
autonomy medium equals 1 for TTOs whose priorities are jointly set by TTO and university management. 
Thirdly, TTO autonomy high equals 1 when only the Director and staff of the TTOs are in charge of defining 
TTO priorities. The degree of decisional and operational autonomy of the TTO is an important influential 
factor for the modes of universities’ engagement in KT activities (Bercovitz et al., 2002; Siegel et al, 2003; 
Markmann et al., 2005; Axanova, 2012; Schoen et al., 2014; Derrick 2015). Previous studies share the idea 
that creating a decentralized TTO within the university may be instrumental to securing a sufficient level of 
autonomy for developing relationships with industry (Bercovitz and Feldman 2006; Debackere and Veugelers, 
2005; Goldfarb and Henrekson 2002; Rasmussen and Borch 2010). In fact, it is important that TTOs are not 
subject to pressures for revenue generation or for pursuing local development strategies, which are generally 
related to centrally-defined profit and socio-economic objectives. Therefore, it is arguable that TTOs’ 
autonomy with respect to the university administration is higher among TTOs that pursue service strategies, 
hence directed at maximizing the valorization of research discoveries.  
We measure TTO size based on the number of employees who worked at the TTO in 2014, and we 
include its logarithm in the regressions. We expect that larger TTOs plays a crucial role for KT activities, 
notably for income-oriented ones (Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Caldera and Debande 2010; Siegel et al. 2003). 
TTO size is a measure of its experience, therefore we expect that it is positively linked to TTO income-related 
outputs (Lach and Schankerman, 2004; Siegel et al. 2003; Friedman and Silberman, 2003). Finally, we 
construct a dummy variable that is called Multi-university TTO, assuming a value 1 for TTOs that provide their 
KT services to more than one university and 0 for those that serve only one university. TTOs that serve more 
than one institution are expected to be structurally different from TTOs that are embedded in a university. 
While the former are often separate institutions following a for-profit logic, the latter are fully part of the 
university structure, sometimes being one of its various administrative departments. Therefore, we expect 
this characteristic to be differently linked to universities’ KT strategies.  
University level control variables 
We control for university size, for the presence of a university hospital and of a university Incubator. 
University size is measured through three exclusive dummies that indicate three size bands for small, medium 
and large institutions. Small universities are those employing less than 500 academic researchers in 2014; 
Medium universities employ between 500 and 2000 researchers; Large universities employ more than 2000 
researchers. Medium-large universities, due to their size and visibility, are expected to be better in the 
generation of innovative knowledge and, in particular, in the creation of social and professional networks for 
business development support. Thus, we expect a stronger orientation of these universities toward service-
to-faculty KT strategies. The presence of hospitals, which we measure with a dummy variable equaling 1 for 
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universities hosting a hospital, implies strong attention to medical and related research, which enables the 
achievement of university-owned patented inventions and their commercial exploitation. Therefore, we 
expect this variable to be related to universities’ KT strategic orientation toward income-generation. Finally, 
we introduce a dummy variable called University incubator that indicates whether there is an incubator inside 
the university. We expect that the establishment of an incubator, which supports the process of start-up 
formation by university faculty, may be related to a higher propensity of universities to pursue economic 
development goals.  
Regional level control variables 
The last two control variables account for NUTS2 level information on the regions where universities are 
located. These are Regional patents, which measures the number of EPO patent applications submitted in 
the regions in 2014 and controls for the innovation intensity of the region; and Regional size, which measures 
the population in 2014.13  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables that are employed in the 
regression analysis. As far as the dependent variables are concerned, it is particularly useful to show their 
distribution by geography, so to test for variation across European areas.14 Figure 2 presents the breakdown 
across four European country groups: north (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom), west (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), east 
(Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, and Slovenia) and south (Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). The Service-to-faculty KT strategy is predominant among universities in 
Northern and Eastern countries, while Income-generation is highly relevant for universities in the West; the 
Local development KT strategy is predominant in southern universities.  
As far as the main regressors of interests are concerned, a total of 87% of the universities of our 
sample is made up of generalist universities, thus displaying a high level of horizontal differentiation, and 
38% were part of the THE Ranking in 2014, thus displaying top positioning in their vertical quality 
differentiation. Figure 3 shows that Income generation is predominant among specialist universities while 
local development prevails among generalist ones. Figure 4 shows that high prestige institutions mainly 
                                                            
13 Both variables are used in logarithm in the regressions. 
14 The dependent variables originate from standardized variables, hence presenting mean equal to 0 and standard 
deviation equal to 1. The bar charts in Figure 2 indicate the mean value of each KT strategy in each given country 
group, with respect to the mean in the full sample (0). Therefore, positive values indicate that the mean in a given 
sub-group is higher than the mean in the full sample, whereas negative values indicate that the sub-group mean is 
lower than the full sample mean. 
19 
 
pursue service-to-faculty KT strategies, while local development is predominant among universities that were 
not included in the THE ranking 2014. 
As for control variables, 22% of the university’s TTOs have incentive schemes for TTO staff and/or 
management, while the distribution of the three autonomy levels from the lowest to the highest is 21%, 45% 
and 34%. It is also notable that only 11% of the universities host multi-institution TTOs, while 42% of the 
universities host a hospital, and 60% host an incubator. Finally, most of the universities in our sample are 
medium-to-large sized institutions (72%), and they employ more than 500 researchers. 
-- TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE – 
-- FIGURES 2, 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE –  
 
5. Methodology and results 
5.1 Econometric strategy 
We estimate three models for each university KT strategy that has been identified. Because the dependent 
variables are continuous and normal, we employ OLS regressions, supported by robust standard errors to 
allow heteroskedasticity of the error terms.  
We are concerned that the sample of survey respondents is not representative of the overall 
population of the universities that we contacted, hence raising a potential selection bias problem due to non-
responses. To address this issue and to ensure that it does not directly affect our results, we correct our 
regressions with an inverse probability weighting scheme (Wooldridge, 2002). In the first place, we run a 
probit regression to estimate the likelihood of survey response. The dependent variable is a 0-1 dummy 
indicating whether universities responded to the survey, while the regressors include three dummy variables 
indicating universities geographical area (West, South, and East)15 and a dummy variable indicating whether 
universities were included in the THE Ranking.16 Secondly, we predict probabilities from the probit 
regressions and we employ them to construct weights to be used in the main regressions. In the OLS 
estimates, each observation is weighted for the inverse of the predicted probability of survey response.  
5.2 Main results 
Table 5 shows the results of the probit estimation: all the coefficients are statistically significant at 1-5% level. 
In particular, our sample seems to over-represent higher quality universities and Eastern universities. These 
                                                            
15 North is the baseline category. 
16 We also include a dummy variable to control for missing values of the variable Y/N THE Ranking. The % of missing 
values in the sample of contacted universities is 19%, it is 8% in the sample of respondents. 
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patterns may well depend on the above-mentioned issue of non-response bias. The employment of weights 
constructed on the basis on the predicted probability of response, as derived from the probit estimation, will 
ensure that over- (under-) represented observations are assigned lower- (higher-) importance in the OLS 
regressions. Table 6 presents the main results of the weighted OLS regressions. For each dependent variable, 
we estimate a model where we include only the main regressors of interest (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and a 
model that includes all the control variables (columns (2), (4) and (6)). We test for multicollinearity via the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test, reported at the bottom of the table. The mean VIF is always below the 
threshold of 6, which would indicate problems of collinearity. 
In the first place, the coefficients of the independent variable Generalist university are negative and 
significant (at 1% level) in the Income-generation KT strategy and positive and significant (at 1% level) in Local  
development KT strategy. The negative coefficient in column (2) indicate that the importance of the income 
KT strategy for generalist universities is 0.76 lower than that for specialist universities. On the contrary, the 
positive coefficient in column (6) shows that the importance of the local development strategy is 0.68 higher 
for generalist universities. In other words, generalist universities attach less importance to the Income 
generation KT strategy and more importance to the local development KT strategy. This is in line with our 
discussion of the role of university horizontal diversity (Hp 1). In fact, universities that choose to offer a wide 
range of courses rather than a few highly specialized scientific subjects, tend to focus on wide-reaching 
objectives such as generating opportunities for students and, more generally, contributing to the economic 
development of the local areas. Instead, specialized institutions, due to the availability of highly specialized 
researchers, have the capabilities and critical mass to exploit income-generation oriented opportunities such 
as research contracts and IP-related activities and to establish fruitful connections with industry. Therefore, 
as far as university horizontal diversity is concerned, hypotheses 1.a and 1.c are confirmed, while hypothesis 
1.b is not.  
Secondly, the coefficient of the independent variable High prestige university is positive and 
significant (at 10% level) in the Income-generation KT strategy and negative and significant (at 10% level in 
the models with no control variables) in the Local development KT strategy. The magnitude of the coefficients 
indicate that the difference in the importance of the income strategy between high and low prestige 
institutions is 0.34 (column (2)), while it is -0.3 for the local development strategy (column (5)).  High quality 
institutions attach more importance to income related objectives and less importance to local development 
objectives. Our results are in line with what we hypothesized (Hp 2), especially in the case of the Income-
generation strategy, since the coefficient is significant when introducing all control variables. In particular, 
higher prestigious research facilitates the generation of a robust pool of technologies available for 
commercialization, thereby increasing the propensity of researchers to exploit their inventions and capturing 
the rents that generated by their intellectual capital (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; O’Shea et al., 2005; Owen-
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Smith and Powell, 2001). Therefore, as far as vertical diversity is concerned, we find support for hypothesis 
2.a, while hypothesis 2.c is partially confirmed and hypothesis 2.b is not confirmed.  
As for control variables, universities that have established incentive schemes for KT practitioners that 
work inside TTOs attach more importance to income generation  (+0.54, p<0.001)  with respect to universities 
that do not have such schemes. As expected, incentives that are directly addressed to KT practitioners boost 
their productivity of KT outputs that bring income streams to universities, such as IPR, licensing and research 
contracts. In addition, higher autonomy levels are positively and significantly related to the relevance of the 
service KT strategy for universities. The dummy TTO autonomy medium indicates that a coordinated effort 
between a university’s central administration and the TTO staff and/or management in setting KT priorities 
is better than central coordination only (TTO autonomy low is the baseline). These results show that the more 
autonomous TTOs are, the better they are in supporting university researchers in the exploitation of their 
research results. In fact, an excessive bureaucracy and inflexibility of university administrators represent 
relevant barriers to TTO operations (Siegel et al, 2003). Finally, larger TTOs and TTOs that serve multiple 
universities positively contribute to the reliance on the income KT strategy.  
-- TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE -- 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results through two sets of regressions. In the first place, we replicate the 
weighted OLS regressions on slightly different dependent variables. While the previously defined dependent 
variables are weighted averages of each of the seven question items (where weights are the scoring 
coefficients of the factors extracted through FA), in the new dependent variables we only include the items 
explained by each given latent factor, thus being those with the highest factor scoring coefficients. To work 
out the new dependent variables, we compute the average between items.17 This strategy allows to obtain 
three dependent variables that only account for the most highly correlated KT objectives within KT strategy 
on the basis of the explorative factor analysis, but yet independent from it. 
The results, reported in Table 7, confirm our previous findings as far as the role of horizontal diversity for 
income and development strategies is concerned. The Income-generation KT strategy is negatively related to 
the variable Generalist (columns (1) and (2)) while the Local development strategy is positively related 
(columns (5) and (6)). In addition, the new results support hypothesis 1.b, according to which specialist 
universities are more oriented towards the Service-to-faculty KT strategy. The coefficient of Generalist is 
negative and significant (at 1-5% level) in columns (3) and (4). As for the role of university vertical diversity, 
the results in Table 7 qualitatively confirm the positive contribution of academic prestige to the importance 
                                                            
17 For instance, the new variable Income generation strategy is the mean between item (1) Revenue generation from 
licensing and (2) Revenue generation from research. 
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of income-related KT objectives (column (2)), while they confirm the negative relationship with local 
development strategy in the reduced model (column (5)). 
The second robustness check consists of three separate probit regressions that we run to estimate the 
probability that a given KT strategy is the prevalent one for a given university. This is in line with the argument 
that universities tend to (and should) adopt a specific strategic approach to KT, so to achieve the best results 
goals (Feldman et al., 2002; Sharer and Faley, 2008; Siegel et al., 2007). To implement these models, we 
create three dummy variables – Income strategy dummy, Service strategy dummy and Local strategy dummy 
– from the total standardized ratings obtained by each strategy. For each variable, we generate a dummy 
that is equal to 1 when the total rating is in the third or fourth quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
By doing so, we measure the probability that universities attaches high importance to a given strategy, thus 
accounting for the probability that it mainly pursues that strategy. 
The results reported in Table 8 shows that Generalist universities mainly pursue the Economic development 
strategy (columns (5) and (6)), while specialist ones are more oriented towards income and services related 
KT strategies (columns (1) to (4)). This is in line with the hypotheses of our work. The results particularly 
confirms our main findings as far as hypotheses 1.a and 1.c are concerned. As for High prestige universities, 
the results in Table 8 qualitatively confirms the positive contribution of academic prestige to the importance 
of income-related KT objectives (column (2)), while they confirm the negative relationship with local 
development strategy in column (5). 
-- TABLES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE – 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has investigated the strategies adopted by European universities in performing KT activities and 
their determinants. Specifically, we studied the role of university horizontal and vertical diversity for three 
KT strategies:  income-generation strategy, service-to-faculty strategy and local development strategy. This 
study is motivated by the consideration that universities’ strategic choices in knowledge transfer should be 
aligned with more general goals and missions of the academic institution and they should reflect its 
distinctive characteristics (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Feldman et al., 2002; Siegel et al., 2007). To help 
universities in their choice, it is fundamental to identify the set of drivers that should guide them. For this 
reasons, we focus on the scope of university disciplinary subject mix and research activity (horizontal 
diversity) and on university positioning in the hierarchy of prestige (vertical diversity). Moreover, we aim at 




To conduct our investigation, we exploit a novel data source that is made up of an original survey of 
European university TTO managers, combined with data from the ETER dataset, the THE Ranking and the 
Eurostat Regional Statistics. The results of our empirical analysis show that generalist universities attach more 
importance to the local development KT strategy, whereas specialist universities mainly pursue the income 
generation strategy. High prestige universities are more oriented towards the income-generation strategy 
and, on the contrary, low prestige universities seem to be more prone to pursue the local development 
strategy. Furthermore, we find that TTO incentives positively influence the prevalence of the income-
generation strategy, and autonomy of the TTO increases the relevance of the service-to-faculty strategy. Two 
robustness checks confirm our results, and add that specialist universities attach more importance also to 
the service-to-faculty strategy.  
This study provides interesting as well as relevant insights about the relationship between university 
characteristics and KT strategy, and it does so at the European level. In addition, it contributes to the 
theoretical and empirical literature on higher education institutions in several ways. Firstly, we take a step 
forward in the application of the notion of strategy to universities, in the specific case of the so-called Third 
Mission activities.. We thus contribute to the growing literature analysing the notion of university strategy 
(Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2007; Daraio et al., 2011; Deiaco et al., 2012; Warning, 2004). Studies in this domain 
have shown the usefulness of adopting a strategic perspective to explain major differences in the extent to 
which universities exercise authority over resource acquisition and position themselves in their environment. 
However, existing studies have mainly focused on the characterization of universities along the two 
traditional missions of education and research, whereas our work contributes to the identification of 
universitiy strategies in the “Third Mission” area. In this respect, our findings highlight the heterogeneity of 
approaches and priorities in governing the interactions between universities and their economic and societal 
environment. This heterogeneity calls for caution in making strong generalizations about the university–
industry interface, and should be carefully considered as well in policy recommendations, as we discuss in 
detail below. Starting from the idea that universities are heterogeneous, given their unique histories, 
different capabilities, resources and organizational structures (Bercovitz et al., 2001), we show that it is also 
possible to distinguish various strategic approaches to KT strategies. In particular, we theoretically classify 
and  empirically test for the first time the existence of three different strategic approaches to KT activities. 
We also document important variations across European countries in the extent of adoption of KT strategies. 
This is an additional unique empirical contribution of the paper. In fact, while previous evidence has mainly 
focused on the US or on individual European countries, we leverage on multi-country evidence to show an 
extremely variegated European landscape in terms of KT priorities of universities. 
Secondly, we make a further contribution by suggesting that these KT strategies are more or less 
likely to be preferred and undertaken depending on important determinants at the university level. In 
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particular, we first focus on university horizontal diversity, which is the broadness of the subjects covered by 
the university in their primary activities. On this matter, we contribute to a growing literature on the 
specialization of universities and its impact on scientific, economic and social outcomes (Bonaccorsi et al., 
2013; Pastor and Serrano, 2016). In the context of university-industry collaborations and Third Mission 
activities, the scientific specialization of universities has been related to direct output measures, such as the 
creation of spinoff firms (O’Shea et al., 2015) or the generation of new patents (Acosta et al., 2018). It has 
also been related to knowledge spillover effects, based on the idea that universities with different scientific 
specializations nurture territories with diverse knowledge inputs (Bonaccorsi et al., 2013). We make an 
additional contribution to this literature by highlighting the influence exerted by university specialization on 
the definition of strategic priorities for KT, which can be seen as an important antecedent of such direct and 
indirect outcomes. In addition to that, we focus on university vertical diversity, which is its positioning in a 
hierarchy of prestige, in order to assess how it leads universities’ decisions on the most suitable KT strategy 
to pursue. Our findings thus contribute to the stream of the literature analyzing the effects of university 
prestige on commercialization activities (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Sine et al., 2003; Lee and Stuen, 2016). 
They show that high-prestige universities are more likely to pursue an income-generation strategy, being 
better positioned to establish collaboration activities and to accomplish commercialisation agreements.  
Finally, we contribute to a growing stream of the literature emphasizing the role of context in 
stimulating the extent and variety of entrepreneurial activities by universities and other institutions, as well 
as its impact on outcomes (Autio et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2017; Rasmussen et al., 2014). While several studies 
in this domain have looked at the link between institutional determinants and single outcome dimensions, 
we investigate the role of KT strategy as an important component in the process. By doing so, we document 
a broad set of organizational and institutional influences on the KT strategic choices of universities. 
The analysis and results of this paper pave the way for future research in this field. At the empirical 
level, the cross-section nature of available data cannot rule out reverse causality concerns on the relation 
between university characteristics and their strategies. Indeed, while we claim that university characteristics 
affect university KT strategies, the opposite might as well happen, thus suggesting that university 
characteristics change as a response to a given KT strategy pursued. Future research aiming at uncovering 
the causal determinants of university KT strategies should make use of administrative data on universities 
available through a long time span. Unfortunately, such data is rarely available, and if so, hardly at European 
level. Moreover, a deeper understanding on the interactions between KT strategic choices and organizational 
arrangements of TTOs is desired. TTOs can adopt various organizational configurations for structuring 
internal processes related to IP protection, research commercialization, university-firm collaboration and 
promotion of entrepreneurship. Critical to success is the implementation of organizational structures and 
processes that are suitable for the strategic orientation and the distinctive characteristics of the university. 
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Future studies should therefore analyze in more depth, ideally through selected case-studies, the 
evolutionary process through which such dimensions unfolds. Finally, we were not able to assess the ultimate 
economic and social impact of KT strategic choices. New studies should investigate the implications of 
pursuing a given strategy with respect to another in terms of short-term outcomes and long-term impact. 
To conclude, since we document and validate the existence of different (although deeply 
intertwined) strategic options to guide KT activities within universities, our study presents significant 
managerial implications for university and TTO administrators on how to prioritize objectives and activities 
in the field of knowledge transfer. Different strategies in KT imply different goals to pursue, processes to 
implement, relationships to create, stakeholders to engage with, indicators to monitor and, more generally, 
choices to make. First, our results suggest that universities’ strategic choices in knowledge transfer should 
reflect the more general goals and distinctive characteristics of the academic institution and of its external 
environment. Too often, in the past, the complex mechanisms through which universities interact with 
industry and society have been interpreted with a very narrow focus, mostly centred on IP commercialization 
activities via patenting and spin-offs. In addition to that, the experiences of largely successful, high-prestige 
academic institutions are often indicated as best practices to imitate, irrespective of the institutional and 
local context. Differently from that, our results confirm that there is certainly no one-size-fits-all model for 
defining the KT strategy of an academic institution, and that each university must adapt strategic choices to 
its own identity, culture and specific ecosystem. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that university KT strategic priorities should be made explicit, 
communicated within the institution, and translated into objectives and indicators, so to enhance awareness 
and monitoring at all levels. The deliberate communication of KT strategic priorities should reach different 
groups of stakeholders, internally (including researchers and students) and externally. As for the former, the 
first obvious target group is represented by the TTO of the institution and by other intermediaries involved 
in the KT process (such as incubators or accelerators). These actors should receive from the university top 
management a clear strategic mandate to pursue in the KT domain, and ideally they should be directly 
involved in the process of generating such goals. For a university TTO, as for any organization, having 
unfocused goals can lead to conflicting operational objectives and ultimately to ineffectiveness. 
Finally, our results have also profound implications for evaluation activities, of both university 
administrators and national or regional policy-makers. Often the assessment of KT activities of universities is 
conducted with reference to a narrow set of KT outputs (i.e. number of patents, licensing agreements, spin-
offs). This is likely to underestimate the varied channels through which universities transfer knowledge to 
external stakeholders. In addition to that, it does not consider that there might exist profound differences 
across universities that are likely to lead to different profiles in terms of KT strategies, outcome levels and 
ultimate impact. Our results highlight the importance of monitoring the effectiveness of universities’ 
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knowledge transfer activities by taking into account a broad range of indicators, so to allow for a greater 
variety of forms of KT engagement. They also show the importance of tracing such indicators and comparing 
them with appropriate external benchmarks, since the extent of KT activities is largely influenced by 
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  Variable name Description Data source 
         
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
1 Economic development 
strategy 
Weighted average of standardised ratings of items (1) to (7), 
where weights are factor analysis scoring coefficients for Factor 
1 
survey of European University/TTOs 
2 Income-generation strategy  Weighted average of standardised ratings of items (1) to (7), 
where weights are factor analysis scoring coefficients for Factor 
2 
survey of European University/TTOs 
3 Service-to-faculty strategy Weighted average of standardised ratings of items (1) to (7), 
where weights are factor analysis scoring coefficients for Factor 
3 
survey of European University/TTOs 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
4 Generalist university dummy = 1 for generalist (vs specialised) University ETER dataset 
5 High prestige university 
dummy = 1 for University ranked in the Times Higher Education 
Ranking Times Higher Education Ranking 2014 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
6 TTO incentives dummy = 1 for the presence of incentives for TTOs survey of European University/TTOs 
7 TTO autonomy low dummy = 1 for low level of TTO decisional autonomy survey of European University/TTOs 
8 TTO autonomy medium dummy = 1 for medium level of TTO decisional autonomy survey of European University/TTOs 
9 TTO autonomy high dummy = 1 for high level of TTO decisional autonomy survey of European University/TTOs 
10 TTO size (log) log of number of TTO employees survey of European University/TTOs 
11 TTO age (log) log of TTO age survey of European University/TTOs 
12 Multi-university TTO dummy = 1 for TTOs serving more than one PRO survey of European University/TTOs 
13 Small university dummy = 1 for small-size University (<500 researchers) survey of European University/TTOs 
14 Medium university dummy = 1 for medium-size University (500-2000 researchers) survey of European University/TTOs 
15 Large university dummy = 1 for large-size University (>2000 researchers) survey of European University/TTOs 
16 University hospital dummy = 1 for the presence of University hospital ETER dataset 
17 University incubator dummy = 1 for the presence of University incubator survey of European University/TTOs 
18 Regional patents (log) log of EPO patent application at NUTS 2 level Eurostat Regional Statistics 
19 Regional size (log) log of population at NUTS 2 level Eurostat Regional Statistics 





Factor/KT strategy Survey item Loading 
Income generation strategy (Axanova, 2012; Barjak et 
al., 2014; Feldman et al., 2002). 
1) Revenue generation from licensing 0.8644 
2) Revenue generation from research 0.6716 
   
Service-to-faculty strategy 
(Axanova, 2012; Rasor and Heller, 2006; Sharer and 
Faley, 2008) 
3) Facilitate practical application of research discoveries 0.5006 
6) Provide service to faculty 0.8717 
   
Economic development strategy 
(Axanova, 2012; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Sharer 
and Faley, 2008; Munari et al., 2016, 2018) 
4) Economic development through spin-off creation 0.7395 
5) Contribution to local and regional development 0.7883 
7) Generate opportunities for students 0.6807 




      
Variable names Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Economic development strategy 178 0 1 -2.63 2.03 
Income-generation strategy 178 0 1 -2.91 2 
Service-to-faculty strategy 178 0 1 -3.35 1.94 
Generalist university 178 0.87 0.33 0.00 1 
High prestige university 178 0.38 0.49 0.00 1 
TTO incentives 178 0.22 0.42 0.00 1 
TTO autonomy low 178 0.21 0.41 0.00 1 
TTO autonomy medium 178 0.45 0.50 0.00 1 
TTO autonomy high 178 0.34 0.48 0.00 1 
TTO size (log) 178 2.11 1.09 0.00 5.52 
TTO age (log) 178 2.03 0.84 0.00 4.57 
Multi-university TTO 178 0.11 0.31 0.00 1 
Small university 178 0.29 0.45 0.00 1 
Medium university 178 0.35 0.48 0.00 1 
Large university 178 0.37 0.48 0.00 1 
University hospital 178 0.42 0.50 0.00 1 
University incubator 178 0.60 0.49 0.00 1 
Regional patents (log) 178 3.74 1.61 -1.28 6.36 
Regional size (log) 178 14.78 0.84 12.66 16.47 





                     
                     
 Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
                     
1 Income generation strategy 1                                     
2 Service-to-faculty strategy 0 1                  
3 Economic development strategy 0 0 1                 
4 Generalist university -0.14 -0.03 0.15* 1                               
5 High prestige university -0.02 0.06 -0.07 0.23* 1                             
6 TTO incentives 0.29* -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.03 1              
7 TTO autonomy low -0.07 -0.15 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.06 1             
8 TTO autonomy medium -0.13 0.15* 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.46* 1            
9 TTO autonomy high 0.18* -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.37* -0.65* 1           
10 TTO size (log) 0.28* 0.07 -0.10 0.04 0.12 0.18* -0.13 0.07 0.04 1                   
11 TTO age (log) -0.05 0.04 -0.20* 0.03 0.30* -0.08 0.13 -0.06 -0.05 0.10 1         
12 Multi-university TTO 0.30* -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.05 -0.13 0.10 0.39* -0.17* 1        
13 Small university 0.06 -0.00 0.10 -0.16* -0.16* 0.08 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.17* -0.27* -0.18* 1       
14 Medium university -0.12 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.15* -0.14 0.15* -0.16* 0.04 -0.22* 0.07 -0.18* -0.46* 1      
15 Large university 0.06 -0.08 -0.10 0.19* 0.30* 0.07 -0.10 0.07 0.02 0.38* 0.18* 0.34* -0.48* -0.55* 1     
16 University hospital 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.33* 0.35* -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 -0.24* 0.04 0.18* 1    
17 University incubator 0.17* -0.05 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.22* 0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.08 1   
18 Regional patents (log) -0.13 -0.01 -0.19* -0.05 0.27* -0.19* 0.13 0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.35* 0.14 -0.22* -0.13 0.33* 0.08 -0.11 1  
19 Regional size (log) 0.1 -0.07 0.03 -0.16* 0.02 0.15* -0.11 -0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.21* 0.02 0.23* -0.16* -0.06 0.04 0.20* -0.28* 1 






Variables Survey response 
Western Europe 0.541*** 
 (0.162) 
Southern Europe 0.311** 
 (0.154) 
Eastern Europe 1.329*** 
 (0.224) 
THE Ranking Y/N 0.381*** 
 (0.130) 






Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
























Generalist university -0.542*** -0.764*** -0.325 -0.141 0.650*** 0.683*** 
 (0.189) (0.210) (0.202) (0.204) (0.193) (0.216) 
High prestige univ. 0.188 0.336* 0.00730 0.138 -0.300* -0.0617 
 (0.201) (0.186) (0.185) (0.200) (0.163) (0.180) 
TTO incentives  0.543***  0.00716  0.214 
  (0.133)  (0.173)  (0.184) 
TTO auton. medium  0.00264  0.541**  0.221 
  (0.197)  (0.209)  (0.219) 
TTO auton. high  0.270  0.221  0.188 
  (0.187)  (0.226)  (0.215) 
TTO size (log)  0.152**  0.0207  -0.0723 
  (0.0726)  (0.0864)  (0.0892) 
TTO age (log)  0.0710  -0.0351  -0.0640 
  (0.0898)  (0.103)  (0.101) 
Multi-univ. TTO  0.811***  0.00481  0.149 
  (0.185)  (0.255)  (0.217) 
Medium university  -0.179  0.181  -0.0756 
  (0.219)  (0.184)  (0.207) 
Large university  -0.357  -0.250  -0.185 
  (0.244)  (0.227)  (0.230) 
University hospital  0.119  -0.181  -0.224 
  (0.154)  (0.175)  (0.176) 
University incubator  0.0696  -0.260  0.182 
  (0.150)  (0.164)  (0.167) 
Region patents (log)  -0.174***  -0.0547  -0.0650 
  (0.0502)  (0.0593)  (0.0644) 
Region size (log)  -0.163*  0.0447  -0.0928 
  (0.0940)  (0.122)  (0.114) 
Western Europe 0.926*** 0.784*** -0.501** -0.242 -0.150 0.0512 
 (0.294) (0.262) (0.242) (0.255) (0.212) (0.255) 
Eastern Europe 0.308 0.255 -0.398 -0.534* -0.354 -0.323 
 (0.342) (0.325) (0.255) (0.285) (0.262) (0.306) 
Southern Europe 0.535* 0.358 -0.682*** -0.719*** 0.276 0.260 
 (0.289) (0.276) (0.215) (0.237) (0.205) (0.254) 
Constant -0.103 2.546* 0.763*** 0.0241 -0.474** 1.104 
 (0.297) (1.466) (0.243) (1.838) (0.235) (1.761) 
       
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.154 0.403 0.078 0.159 0.121 0.181 
Log Likelihood -245.2 -214.2 -241.5 -233.4 -236.5 -230.2 
F 5.240 6.637 3.060 2.368 5.777 2.220 
Adj. R-squared 0.130 0.340 0.0512 0.0696 0.0956 0.0937 
Mean VIF 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6 Main results. Weighted OLS regressions. Dependent variables: Income generation strategy, Service-to-faculty strategy, 
























       
Generalist university -0.258* -0.395** -0.420*** -0.309** 0.494*** 0.526*** 
 (0.139) (0.168) (0.161) (0.153) (0.143) (0.159) 
High prestige univ. 0.0497 0.229 0.0951 0.183 -0.223* -0.0360 
 (0.156) (0.144) (0.127) (0.134) (0.120) (0.131) 
       
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country group dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.232 1.643 0.742*** 0.584 -0.385** 0.716 
 (0.211) (1.290) (0.184) (1.438) (0.175) (1.313) 
       
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.109 0.343 0.134 0.234 0.126 0.189 
Log Likelihood -209.5 -182.4 -192.3 -181.3 -182.9 -176.2 
F 3.625 4.841 5.267 3.836 5.976 2.404 
Adj. R-squared 0.0833 0.273 0.109 0.153 0.100 0.103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7 Robustness checks. Weighted OLS regressions. Differently coded dependent variables. 
 



















       
Generalist university -0.429 -0.594* -0.839** -0.812** 1.256*** 1.441*** 
 (0.331) (0.361) (0.329) (0.344) (0.337) (0.355) 
High prestige univ. -0.00652 0.268 0.0886 0.271 -0.595** -0.329 
 (0.226) (0.267) (0.229) (0.277) (0.243) (0.264) 
       
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country group dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.0796 1.827 1.348*** 3.971* -0.745* 0.218 
 (0.396) (2.409) (0.457) (2.364) (0.442) (2.512) 
       
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Chi2 9.448 38.71 17.31 42.49 21.92 38.17 
Log Likelihood -301.1 -263.8 -284.6 -252.3 -280.4 -265.4 
p-value 0.0925 0.00196 0.00395 0.000570 0.000543 0.00233 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0522 0.170 0.104 0.206 0.116 0.163 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8 Robustness check. Weighted Probit regressions. Dummy dependent variables. 
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8. Figures  
 
Figure 1 Diagram of conceptual model and hypothesised relationships. 
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Figure 3 University KT strategies horizontal differentiation (generalist vs specialist universities) 
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Appendix A – Response rate by country and by country group 
 
 Respondents               Contacted Response rate 
COUNTRY N % out of 178 N % out of 521 % 
Turkey 24 13.48% 24 4.61% 100% 
France 15 8.43% 15 2.88% 100% 
Czech Republic 8 4.49% 8 1.54% 100% 
Poland 8 4.49% 8 1.54% 100% 
Hungary 5 2.81% 5 0.96% 100% 
Estonia 2 1.12% 2 0.38% 100% 
Norway 4 2.25% 5 0.96% 80% 
Serbia 3 1.69% 4 0.77% 75% 
Denmark 7 3.93% 10 1.92% 70% 
Malta 1 0.56% 2 0.38% 50% 
Lithuania 1 0.56% 2 0.38% 50% 
Austria 9 5.06% 20 3.84% 45% 
Germany 14 7.87% 34 6.53% 41% 
The netherlands 7 3.93% 18 3.45% 39% 
Luxembourg 1 0.56% 3 0.58% 33% 
Italy 26 14.61% 85 16.31% 31% 
Portugal 3 1.69% 11 2.11% 27% 
Slovenia 1 0.56% 4 0.77% 25% 
United kingdom 11 6.18% 48 9.21% 23% 
Sweden 3 1.69% 18 3.45% 17% 
Switzerland 3 1.69% 19 3.65% 16% 
Finland 2 1.12% 13 2.50% 15% 
Ireland 3 1.69% 22 4.22% 14% 
Belgium 2 1.12% 15 2.88% 13% 
Spain 14 7.87% 110 21.11% 13% 
Croatia 1 0.56% 0 0.00% 0% 
Greece 0 0.00% 9 1.73% 0% 
Iceland 0 0.00% 1 0.19% 0% 
Bulgaria 0 0.00% 2 0.38% 0% 
Romania 0 0.00% 1 0.19% 0% 
Russia 0 0.00% 1 0.19% 0% 
Slowakia 0 0.00% 1 0.19% 0% 
Ucraine 0 0.00% 1 0.19% 0% 
            
Total 178 100.00% 521   34% 




 Respondents Contacted Response rate 
COUNTRY GROUP N % out of 178 N % out of 521 % 
Eastern Europe 29 16.29% 39 7.49% 74.36% 
Northern Europe 30 16.85% 117 22.46% 25.64% 
Southern Europe 68 38.20% 241 46.26% 28.22% 
Western Europe 51 28.65% 124 23.80% 41.13% 
            
 Total 178   521   34.17% 








Item 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 
1) Revenue generation from licensing 
 
1             
2) Revenue generation from research 
 
0.3549* 1           
3) Facilitate practical application of  
research discoveries 
0.1482* 0.0759 1         
4) Economic development through spin-off  
creation 
0.2217* 0.0149 0.1147 1       
5) Contribution to local and regional  
development 
-0.0244 0.1476* 0.0819 0.3891* 1     
6) Provide service to faculty 
 
-0.0214 0.2069* 0.2058* -0.07 0.0745 1   
7) Generate opportunities for students 
 
-0.094 -0.0494 0.0574 0.2233* 0.3463* 0.1076 1 




     
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative 
          
Factor1 1.65866 0.2238 0.237 0.237 
Factor2 1.43487 0.1723 0.205 0.4419 
Factor3 1.26256 . 0.1804 0.6223 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) =  127.50 Prob>chi2= 0.00 
Table 12 Factor analysis. Method: principal-component factors. Rotation: orthogonal varimax. Number of retained factors: 3. 
 
     
Item Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness  
          
1) Revenue generation from licensing  0.8644  0.2435 
2) Revenue generation from research  0.6716  0.4202 
3) Facilitate practical application of research discoveries   0.5006 0.6651 
4) Economic development through spin-off creation 0.7395   0.3062 
5) Contribution to local and regional development 0.7883   0.3643 
6) Provide service to faculty   0.8717 0.2399 
7) Generate opportunities for students 0.6807   0.4047 


















Item 1 -0.00345 0.61654 -0.13847 
Item 2 -0.04368 0.44747 0.23791 
Item 3 0.05833 0.12752 0.37599 
Item 4 0.45402 0.19835 -0.2637 
Item 5 0.47322 -0.0269 0.04777 
Item 6 -0.04925 -0.07691 0.70423 
Item 7 0.41486 -0.25453 0.14777 
Table 14 Factor scoring coefficients. Method: regression; based on varimax rotated factors. 
 
